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SUMMARY 
Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site 
(NTS), the Test Cell A (TCA) Facility (Figure 1) 
was used in the early to mid-1960s for testing of 
nuclear rocket engines, as part of the Nuclear 
Rocket Development Program, to further space 
travel. Nuclear rocket testing resulted in the 
activation of materials around the reactors and 
the release of fission products and fuel particles.  
 
Figure 1. Test Cell A Facility 
 
The TCA facility, known as Corrective Action 
Unit 115, was decontaminated and 
decommissioned (D&D) from December 2004 to 
July 2005 using the Streamlined Approach for 
Environmental Restoration (SAFER) process, 
under the Federal Facility Agreement and 
Consent Order. The SAFER process allows 
environmental remediation and facility closure 
activities (i.e., decommissioning) to occur 
simultaneously, provided technical decisions are 
made by an experienced decision maker within 
the site conceptual site model. Facility closure 
involved a seven-step decommissioning strategy.  
 
First, preliminary investigation activities were 
performed, including review of process 
knowledge documentation, targeted facility 
radiological and hazardous material surveys, 
concrete core drilling and analysis, shield wall 
radiological characterization, and discrete 
sampling, which proved to be very useful and 
cost-effective in subsequent decommissioning 
planning and execution and worker safety. 
Second, site setup and mobilization of equipment 
and personnel were completed.  
 
Third, early removal of hazardous materials, 
including asbestos, lead, cadmium, and oil, was 
performed ensuring worker safety during more 
invasive demolition activities. Process piping 
was to be verified void of contents. Electrical 
systems were de-energized and other systems 
were rendered free of residual energy.  
 
Fourth, areas of high radiological contamination 
were decontaminated using multiple methods. 
Contamination levels varied across the facility. 
Fixed beta/gamma contamination levels ranged 
up to 2 million disintegrations per minute 
(dpm)/100 centimeters squared (cm2) 
beta/gamma. Removable beta/gamma 
contamination levels seldom exceeded 1,000 
dpm/100 cm2, but, in railroad trenches on the 
reactor pad containing soil on the concrete pad in 
front of the shield wall, the beta dose rates 
ranged up to 120 milli-roentgens per hour from 
radioactivity entrained in the soil. General area 
dose rates were less than 100 micro-roentgens 
per hour. Prior to demolition of the reactor shield 
wall, removable and fixed contaminated surfaces 
were decontaminated to the best extent possible, 
using traditional decontamination methods. 
 
Fifth, large sections of the remaining structures 
were demolished by mechanical and open-air 
controlled explosive demolition (CED). 
Mechanical demolition methods included the use 
of conventional demolition equipment for 
removal of three main buildings, an exhaust 
stack, and a mobile shed. The 5-foot (ft), 5-inch 
(in.) thick, neutron-activated reinforced concrete 
shield was demolished by CED, which had never 
been performed at the NTS.   
 
The shield wall was contaminated with 
significant levels of 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 155Eu.  
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Concrete core sample analysis showed induced 
radioactivity to a depth of 20 in. (Figure 2). The 
highest level of activated concrete was at the 
center point of the exposed surface of the shield 
wall in front of where the reactors were operated. 
Radioactivity levels diminished laterally and 
horizontally with distance from that point. The 
major radiological hazard in CED was the 
release of airborne dust with high levels of 
radioactivity.  
Figure 2. Shield Wall Characterization 
 
Conventional explosives (i.e., C-4) were loaded 
into over 400 pre-drilled holes, to a minimum 
depth of 36 in. approximately 2.5 ft apart, so the 
explosives generating the fine dust were  
pulverizing clean concrete instead of 
radiologically-impacted concrete on the outer 20 
in. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
CAP-88C program (i.e., Gaussian plume model) 
was used for atmospheric dispersion modeling to 
determine the bounding airborne radioactivity 
concentrations that could be expected from CED. 
The CED was closely monitored and resulted in 
no radiological exposure or atmospheric release; 
resulting radiological analysis of the sticky pads, 
placed radially around the shield wall, revealed 
levels less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2 for all sticky 
pads immediately after the blast. 
   
The shield wall was covered with a layer of 
geotextile material, secured by tying chain-link 
fence to the wall (Figure 3) to minimize the 
velocity of ejected materials, control the area 
where the materials would spread, and minimize 
dust. Successful CED of the shield wall, 
performed by Controlled Demolition, Inc., 
demonstrated that this technique is cost efficient, 
and can contribute to accelerated D&D timelines. 
More importantly, this method increased safety 
by removing personnel from repeated exposure 
to heights, noise, radiation, and other hazardous 






Figure 3. CED  of Shield Wall 
 
Sixth, final radiological release surveys were 
performed to document the final status and 
radiological conditions of the remaining concrete 
pads and surrounding soil. The seventh phase, 
waste management, included disposition of over 
1,800 cubic yards of remaining radiologically 
impacted building debris. This material was 
containerized into 140 bags and disposed of as 
low-level waste. 
 
Key lessons learned from the project included 
the following: (1) Targeted preliminary 
investigation activities provided a more solid 
technical approach, reduced surprises and scope 
creep, and made the working environment safer. 
(2) Early identification of risks and uncertainties 
provided opportunities for risk management and 
mitigation planning. (3) Team reviews provided 
an excellent mechanism to consider all aspects of 
the task, integrated safety into activity 
performance, increased team unity and “buy-in” 
and promoted innovative and time saving ideas. 
(4) Development of CED protocols ensured 
safety and control. (5) The same proven D&D 
strategy is now being employed on the larger 
“sister” facility, Test Cell C. 
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